High Risk
IP 112.216.129.27 is a high-risk address originating from South Korea, operated by LG DACOM Corporation on ASN AS3786, with a threat level of 8/10 based on 431 abuse reports and confirmed SSH brute-force activity. The IP was first reported in September 2025 and remained active through March 2026, with honeypot sensors across 20 distinct detection points logging consistent malicious traffic throughout that six-month window.
The report volume of 431 incidents, while attributed to automated honeypot detection systems, reflects sustained probing behavior from this single source. The honeypot data shows repeated multi-jail violations, indicating that the same source repeatedly triggered defensive responses across different detection categories. Violation tallies from defensive software logs include multiple instances in the dozens to nearly two hundred per event, underscoring an automated and persistent attack campaign rather than isolated scanning. The low activity frequency rating alongside high report volume suggests the attacks are targeted and methodical rather than high-volume noise, consistent with credential-stuffing operations that prioritize stealth over throughput.
SSH brute-force activity involves automated systems systematically testing authentication credentials against exposed SSH services, exploiting weak or default passwords to gain unauthorized server access. The recidivist patterns in the detection data indicate that whatever defensive measures were initially applied did not permanently deter the source, allowing it to resume attacks repeatedly. Successful compromise of an SSH service grants attackers shell access, enabling data theft, lateral movement within networks, or deployment of secondary payloads such as backdoors or cryptocurrency miners. Any internet-facing SSH service without hardened authentication is a potential entry point for this threat category.
Administrators should block this IP at the network perimeter firewall and implement automated defensive tools such as fail2ban to ban repeated offenders after configurable threshold violations. Key-based authentication should replace password-only SSH access, and the default SSH port should be changed to reduce automated targeting. Multi-factor authentication provides an additional layer against credential-based compromise, while rate-limiting authentication attempts per source mitigates brute-force feasibility. Continuous monitoring of authentication logs for patterns consistent with the activity described here will enable rapid identification and response to similar threats.
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